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LEGAL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS AND CONTROLLING PERSONS OF U.S.
PUBLICLY-OWNED COMPANIES
ANDRtS V. GIL*

INTRODUCTION
This article outlines the legal duties and responsibilities of corporate
directors and controlling persons' of U.S. publicly-owned companies. Its
purpose is to provide a general understanding of the legal duties involved
in serving as a director or in being a controlling person and to provide
practical guidance in performing such duties.
To that end, this article is divided into three main sections. The first
section outlines general duties and responsibilities imposed by basic principles of law in the United States on corporate directors. The second
section outlines more specific duties and responsibilities imposed by the
federal securities laws. Finally, the third section attempts to provide some
guidelines for performance of the duties outlined in the first two sections.
It should be noted, however, that in the United States the laws prescribing the duties and liabilities of corporate directors and controlling
persons include a combination of state and federal statutes and court
decisions. The business laws of a given state where a corporation is
formed will, in most cases, govern the conduct of its directors and
controlling persons. The federal securities laws also impose specific requirements upon public company directors and controlling persons. In
addition, each state has its own laws governing sales of corporate securities
within that state which must be observed.
Due to the existence of these various sources of legal principles which
may differ among jurisdictions, this article undertakes to deal with broad
areas of concern and attempts to provide legal standards and principles
common to the majority of jurisdictions. It does not purport to state
exact solutions to particular problems. Corporate directors and controlling
persons are urged to seek advice on both general and particular matters
from their corporation's legal advisors and their own legal counsel.

*

Member of the firm of Davis, Polk & Wardwell, New York City. Mr. Gil would like to
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1. A "controlling person" for the purposes of this article is a person or corporate entity which
has the ability to control or influence the voting or disposition of 10% or more of the securities
of a U.S. publicly-owned company, whether through direct or indirect ownership of such securities,
by corporate agreements or otherwise.
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GENERAL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A.

Standard of Care
The legal obligations of directors fall into two broad categories: a duty
of loyalty and a duty of care (including a duty to be attentive to the
corporation's business). In exercising such obligations the directors may
rely on information provided by management or advisors, and decisions
duly made by s-ich directors may be protected under the "business
judgment rule.' '2 The directors may also be indemnified in certain circumstances when they are made a party to litigation by reason of their
role as directors.
1. Duty of Loyalty
By assuming office, the corporate director commits allegiance to the
enterprise and acknowledges that the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders must prevail over any personal, individualized interest.
The basic principle to be observed is that the director should not use
his corporate position to make a personal profit or gain other personal
advantage. As a practical method of complying with the duty of loyalty,
many directors have adopted the practice of absenting themselves from
that portion of a.board meeting during which matters which concern
them personally are considered. The duty of loyalty is manifested by
certain particularized legal concepts, discussed below.
a. Conflict of Interest
When the corporate director has a material personal interest in a contract
or transaction to which the corporation is to be a party (either directly
or indirectly, because of an employment or investment relationship with
an entity with which the corporation is dealing or otherwise) the director
should disclose the existence of such interest, and describe the nature
thereof (e.g., financial, family relationship, professional or business affiliation, etc.) to the other directors prior to the time action is taken by
the board with respect to the matter and, further, he should abstain
from acting therecn. 4 In addition, the interested director should be aware
that appropriate voting and quorum requirements must be met.' Under
prevailing practice, but with significant exceptions in some states, 6 the

2. See MODEL BusInEss CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. The
"business judgment rule" immunizes management from liability in corporate matters when there is
a reasonable basis to indicate that the transaction was made with due care and in good faith.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 200 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See MODEL ACT § 8.51.
4. See id. § 8.60 for definitions relating to conflicts of interest.
5. See id. § 8.24 for quorum and voting requirements.
6. While Delaware, New York and California allow an interested director to be counted toward
a quorum of the board of directors, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(b) (Repl. Vol. 1983)); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. § 713(c) (McKinney 1986); CAL. CORP. § 310(c) (1977), other states such as Alabama
and Minnesota do not. Ste ALA. CODE § 10-2A-63 (Repl. Vol. 1980); MINN. STAT. § 302A.255(1)(c)

(1985).
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interested director may be counted in determining the presence of a
quorum but his vote
of consent may not be counted for purposes of
7
the requisite action .
b. Duty of Fairness
When conflicting interests are present, the corporate director must be
concerned that fairness obligations are recognized and satisfied. If a
transaction by a director with the corporation involves a possible conflict
of interest, fairness to the corporation should be a primary concern for
both the interested director and those disinterested directors entertaining
a request for favorable action.8 The standard commonly used involves
ascertainment that the proposed transaction is on at least as favorable
terms to the corporation as might be available (assuming appropriate
comparability) from any other person or entity. 9 If minority shareholders
may be adversely affected, all directors should be concerned with the
fairness of their treatment. This concern is heightened in instances where
a dominant shareholder or shareholder group has a divergent conflicting
interest known to the corporate director.
c. Corporate Opportunity
When an opportunity (commonly referred to as a "corporate opportunity") to acquire another business enterprise, to acquire property, to
license patents or inventions, to market new products, or to seize any
other business advantage comes to the attention of the corporate director
as a result of his relation to the corporation in a way that would permit
its personal realization, and is relevant to the enterprise's present or
prospective business activities, the director must first present it to his
corporation. 0 Only after informed evaluation and a determination (by
disinterested peers) that the corporation should not pursue such corporate
opportunity, should the corporate director pursue the matter for his own
account or for the benefit of others." If an individual encounters a
corporate opportunity which may be of interest to more than one corporation which he serves as a director, complicated and difficult conflict
questions may be presented.
d. Confidentiality
The director should deal in confidence with all matters involving the
corporation until such time as there has been a general public disclosure
MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 8.31(c), (d).
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (Repl. Vol. 1983) (finding no transaction voidable
solely for reason of conflict of interest if the transaction is fair to the corporation).

7.

9. Courts have also looked at whether the transaction was fair and reasonable. See In re
Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 2 B.R. 687, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd,
633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. See Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (Minn. 1974) (acknowledging that directors cannot
exploit their positions as insiders by appropriating business opportunities properly belonging to the

corporation).
11. See generally

MODEL ACT,

supra note 2, §§ 8.60-8.63, cmt. at 8-391.
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or unless he knows that particular information is a matter of public
record or is a matter of common knowledge. This presumption of a
need for confidential treatment should apply regarding all current information concerning board or corporate activities. The importance of
confidentiality cannot be overemphasized, not only because of financial
exposure for both the corporation and the individual under the federal
securities laws in the event of improper use of so-called "inside information,"'12 but also because of the potential for jeopardy to the enterprise
13
in terms of competitive disadvantage.
2. Duty of Care
In addition to owing a duty of loyalty to the corporation, the corporate
director also assumes a duty to act carefully in fulfilling the important
tasks of monitoring and directing the activities of corporate management.
The Model Business Corporation Act sets forth the legal standard as
follows:
[a] director shE.1 discharge his duties as a director, including his duties
as a member of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he
reasonably believes to
4
be in the best interests of the corporation.
The corporate director also has a responsibility to participate actively
in the oversight of the enterprise's activities. Regular attendance at meetings of the board of directors and board committees is an obvious
requirement for acceptable director performance. In preparation for such
meetings, the corporate director should be furnished with appropriate
information regarding every important matter requiring board actions; in
every case, there should be available to the corporate director sufficient
information furnished in time so as to permit an informed judgment. If
for any reason sufficient information is not made appropriately available,
the corporate director should request that action be delayed until the
information is made available. If action is nonetheless taken, the corporate
director should at a minimum request that his abstention, and reason
therefor, be recorded in the minutes of the meeting. Under these circumstances, he should consider the need for his resignation.
Once documents are provided, the corporate director is expected to
read the material distributed to members of the board. Depending upon
the individual's role (e.g., committee membership or chairmanship), more
detailed analysis may be required.

12. Trading in confidential inside information obtained by virtue of an inside position is prohibited
by Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).

13. The corporation may become competitively disadvantaged; for example, if one of its directors
disclosed new product developments and that information facilitated a competitor's introduction of
a similar product.
14. MODEL AcT, supra note 2, § 8.30(a).
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It is both permissible and expected that the corporate director will
delegate to others (including a board committee) some functions traditionally associated with board activity; however, the delegator has a
responsibility to keep informed as to the activities of the delegatee. The
extent of this monitoring function (which is distinct from the ongoing
monitoring of management's performance) will vary depending upon the
nature and importance of the delegation, and will be satisfied in the
usual case by receipt of periodic reports concerning the activities of the
delegatee.
3. Reliance
The Model Business Corporation Act expressly endorses the concept
of reliance, and this codification of a somewhat diffused common law
standard has been adopted or is under active consideration by a number
of states:
In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements and
other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom
the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the
matters presented;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters
the director reasonably believes are within the person's professional
or expert competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a
member if the director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.'5
The corporate director can make a valuable contribution through relevant inquiry and discussion of management's proposals, and does not
jeopardize the protection intended to be afforded to him if he complements
the "input" on which he proposes to rely with questions and focused
discussion. Moreover, recurring mechanical reliance without critical analysis could place in question the corporate director's exercise of informed
judgment.
4. The Business Judgment Rule
Recognizing that, consistent with the business corporation's profit orientation, business judgment inevitably involves risk evaluation- and assumption, and recognizing that the office of corporate director, as such,
does not require full time commitment to the affairs of the enterprise,
the corporate director frequently makes important decisions which may
eventually prove to be erroneous. A director exercising his good faith
judgment may be protected from liability to his corporation under the
so-called "business judgment rule."'1 6 While not part of the statutory

15. Id. § 8.30(b).
16. See supra note 2.
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framework, this legal concept is well established in the case law of most
jurisdictions. 7 When viewing the decisions of directors acting in the
exercise of free and independent judgment, courts have been extremely
reluctant to find that the directors acted negligently. 18 Recognizing that
business decisions may seem unrealistically simple when viewed with
hindsight, and expressing reluctance to substitute their judgment for that
of directors, courts have generally refrained from questioning the wisdom
of board decisions. 19 For the business judgment rule to apply, however,
a director must have acted in good faith and with a reasonable basis
for believing that the action authorized was in the lawful and legitimate
furtherance of the corporation's purposes, and must have exercised his
honest business judgment after due consideration of what he reasonably
believed to be the relevant factors. 20 The business judgment rule will not
apply in situaticns where conflict of interest or other breaches of the
21
duty of loyalty are present.
5. Indemnification
The Model Business Corporation Act sets out in detail the circumstances
in which there can be indemnification of a corporate director made a
party to litigation. 22 Such a suit might be brought by the corporation or
by a shareholder in the right of the corporation challenging the director's
performance of duties as a director (commonly called a "derivative
action"), 23 or by a governmental agency or private party for a breach
of contract, tortious conduct or violation of law (commonly called a
"third party action"). 24 The Model Act provisions, which have been
adopted by numerous states (including Delaware), give the corporation
power to indemnify directors in third party actions against expenses
(including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement of the action, and in derivative actions against expenses, including

attorneys' fees .25

The common standard for such indemnification is that the director
must have acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed
to be in (or not opposed to) the best interests of the corporation 26 and,
if a criminal action or proceeding is involved, the director must also

17. As of December 1, 1993, thirty-eight jurisdictions require that a director discharge his duties
in good faith and with a stated standard of care. MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 8.30, cmt. at 8175 to 8-176.
18. Instead, "director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence." Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
19. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (finding
court will not substitute its views for those of directors).
20. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
21. See id.

22.

MODEL ACT,

supra note 2, § 8.51.

23. See, e.g., Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1992).
24. See, e.g., Pestolite, Inc. v. Cordura Corp., 449 A.2d 263 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
25. MODEL ACT, supra note 2, §§ 8.50(4)-(5), 8.51(d).
26. Id. § 8.51(a)(1)(i), (ii)(A)(B).
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have "had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful." 27
The indemnification for expenses is automatic if the director has been
successful in the defense of any action, on the merits or otherwise. 28
Indemnification is not mandatory under the customary bylaw provision
where the director is not successful. If the director meets his duties of
loyalty and care, however, it is likely that the standard of conduct required
for indemnification will also be met. In the case of settlements or certain
adverse court determinations in third party actions, indemnification is
permitted upon a determination by an appropriate independent majority
of directors or shareholders, or by independent legal counsel, that the
director met the applicable standard of conduct. 29
It should be noted that the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has
long held the position that indemnification of directors for liability under
the 1933 Securities Act30 is contrary to public policy, and indemnification
in these circumstances would in all likelihood be subject to prior judicial
3
resolution of public policy considerations. 1
B.

Management and Protection of Corporate Assets
Directors are charged with responsibility for the management and protection of corporate assets. 32 This area of responsibility is governed
principally by the laws of the state under which a corporation is formed.
The statutes of most states specifically provide that the business of the
corporation shall be managed by the board of directors and that directors
are ultimately responsible to the stockholders who elect them for actions
or omissions in connection with such management.3 3 The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act 3 4 also charges directors with accountability for corporate
assets.3 5 The assets of employee benefit plans are very significant assets
36
for which directors also have responsibilities.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Accountability for corporate assets is covered by the Securities Exchange
Act of 193437 as amended by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA).3 8 The FCPA not only prohibits bribing foreign officials and

27. Id. § 8.5 I(a)(1)(iii).

28. Id. § 8.52.
29. Id. § 8.55.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988) [hereinafter 1933 Act].
31. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970) (finding that the policies underlying the 1933 Securities Act render void an
indemnification agreement to the extent that as applied it would cover fraudulent misconduct).
32. MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 8.01(b).
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (Repl. Vol. 1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 701 (McKinney
1986).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I to -2, § 78ff (1988).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 46-47.
36. Combined public and private pension assets total roughly $4.4 trillion. Joel Chernoff, U.S.
Pension Assets Reach $4.4 Trillion, in PENsIoNs & INVEsTMENTs 1 (Jan. 25, 1993).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
38. See supra note 34.
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other persons in order to obtain business, 39 but also imposes on United
States companies the obligation to keep books, records and accounts
which "in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of" the company's assets.4 The FCPA also requires
that a United States company devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i)
transactions are executed consistent with management authorization; (ii)
transactions are -ecorded as necessary both to permit the preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or other applicable criteria and to maintain accountability for
assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's generd or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded .accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable
intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences. 4 1
It seems reasonable to expect that the Commission, vested with responsibility for enforcement (along with the Department of Justice, to which
it may recommend criminal prosecutions) of this authority under the 1934
Act, will proceed vigorously where it believes the FCPA has been violated
as part of a scheme to conceal an improper payment or otherwise prevent
the detection of misconduct within the corporation. It is important to
note the SEC's position (which has support in the legislative history of
the FCPA) that it is not necessary to prove corrupt or criminal intent
in order to bring an action to enjoin conduct which violated the FCPA. 42
Subsequent to enactment of the FCPA, the SEC adopted Regulation
13b-2 under the 1934 Act.4 3 Rule 13b2-1 prohibits any person from directly
or indirectly falsifying or causing to be falsified "any book, record or
account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A)" of the 1934 Act. 44 The SEC
determined that although this Rule was not directed solely to the problem
of questionable or illegal payments and practices, its adoption "should
serve to discourage a repetition of the serious abuses the Commission
has uncovered."'' 5 Rule 13b2-2 applies to officers and directors of the
corporation and prohibits the making or causing to be made of "a
materially false or misleading statement"46 or failing to state material
facts to an accountant in connection with the audit of the corporation's
financial statements or the preparation or filing of any document or
report required to be filed with the Commission. 47 The Commission
emphasized its belief that this Rule would "encourage careful and accurate

39. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1988).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1988).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1988).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
43. Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of the Concealment
of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 34-15570,
1979 WL 17892, at *1 (SEC) (Feb. 15, 1979) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (1994).
45. Exchange Act, supra note 43, at *1.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 13b2-2(a) (1994).
47. Id. § 13b2-2(b).
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communications between auditors and the corporations from whom they
request information" and that it was "intended to help restore the efficacy
of the system of corporate accountability and to encourage boards
of
directors to exercise their authority to deal with the problem.' '4
"

2. Employee Benefit Plans
An important aspect of a director's duties with respect to corporate
assets is his fiduciary duty to beneficiaries under employee benefit plans
sponsored by the corporation. Directors' responsibilities in this area are
governed by federal law, namely the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA). 49 Section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA requires
a fiduciary to discharge his or her duties "with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims. "50
Overlapping the "prudent man" standard are two others: "a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries" of the plan, and he 5must
do this "for
the exclusive purpose" of providing benefits to them. 1
Fiduciaries may not knowingly cause plans which they administer to
enter into any of a number of prohibited transactions, including, with
certain exceptions, the sale, exchange or leasing of property between the
plan and a "party in interest" as defined (which term includes fiduciaries);
the lending of money or other exchange 6f credit between the plan and
a party in interest; 52 and acquisition of securities or real property from
the corporate employer in excess of certain specifically permitted limits. 5 3
Fiduciaries are also prohibited from dealing in plan assets for their own
interest, acting in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party
whose interests are adverse to those of the plan or its participants, or
receiving any personal consideration from any party dealing with the plan
in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan.5 4
ERISA provides that any person breaching his or her fiduciary duties
thereunder will be personally liable to make good any losses a plan incurs
as a result of the breach. 5 A fiduciary will also be liable for a breach
of fiduciary duty by another fiduciary with respect to the same plan
under circumstances including knowing participation in or knowing concealment of acts or omissions by other fiduciaries which are known to
be a breach of duty. 6 If a fiduciary has knowledge of a breach of duty

48. Exchange Act, supra note 43, at *11.
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
50. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
51. Id. §§ 1104(a)(1), (a)(l)(A)(i). A fiduciary shall also discharge his duties for the purpose of
"defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A(ii).
52. Id. § 1106(a)(l)(B).
53. Id. § 1107(a).

54. Id.§ 1106(b).
55. Id. § 1109(a).

56. Id.§ 1105(a)(1).
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by another fiduciary, he must make reasonable efforts to remedy the
breach.5 7 There are criminal penalties for willful violation.5 8 While ERISA
does not permit exculpatory agreements to relieve a fiduciary of the
personal liability decreed by the statute, an employer may purchase
insurance to cover the potential liability of persons who act in a fiduciary
capacity.-9
II.

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

The Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act")6° and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") 61 impose specific disclosure obligations on
corporate directors and "controlling persons." Compliance with these
two federal regulatory statutes, as well as with other statutes administered
by the SEC, is essential in order to avoid penalties provided thereunder.
Violation of federal securities laws may result in imposition of criminal
penalties or civil injunctions against the corporation, with similar penalties,
possibly including jail sentences, for its directors, officers and employees.6 2
Substantial damages may also be imposed.6 3 Under both the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act, persons who control a corporation will be liable jointly
and severally to the same extent as the corporation. 64 The controlling
person may avoid liability under the 1933 Act by proving lack of awareness
of the facts giving rise to the corporation's liability, 65 and under the 1934
Act by proving good faith and lack of inducement of the conduct in
question.65
A.

1933 Act Registration Requirements
Under the 1933 Act, disclosure is accomplished by requiring registration
every time a ccrporation sells its securities. 67 Unless an exemption from
the Act exists, the registration process must be followed. 8 Significantly,
the person asserting an exemption has the burden of proving his/her

rights to rely on

it.69

The 1933 Act imposes liability for participation in an illegal distribution
of securities. 70 If a corporation distributes securities through a registration
statement which contains untrue statements or fails to make necessary
statements, the directors of the corporation will be subject to suit by

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. § 1105(a)(3).
Id. § 1131.
Id. § 1110.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
Id. 99 78a-7811.
See, e.g., id. § 78ff (criminal penalties under 1934 Act).
Id.
See, e.g., id. § 78t (discussing liability of controlling persons under 1934 Act).
Id. § 770.
Id. § 78t.
Id. § 77e(c).
Id. § 77d.
See, e.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1980).
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988).
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those persons who purchased the securities.71 Section 11 of the 1933 Act
imposes liability upon directors who fail to demonstrate that they made
a reasonable investigation (consistent with the individual's role and training) of the facts set forth in the registration statement. 72 To this end,
directors should have an opportunity to question management, the outside
auditors and legal counsel as to the procedures followed to achieve
adequate and accurate disclosure.
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act imposes liability upon any person who
negligently sells a security by means of a written offer to sell or an oral
communication which includes an untrue statement or a half-truth.7 3 Under
expanded definitions of the phrase "person who sells," a director could
be included in the category of seller. 74 As a result, a director who
participates in the sale of his corporation's securities may be subject to
liability for negligence in failing to assure that statements in selling
documents are accurate.
Likewise, if a director participates with an issuer in an unregistered
distribution of securities, he may, under the expanded definitions of the
phrase "person who sells," be subject to liability for violation of section
12(1) of the 1933 Act, which grants remedies against a person who
unlawfully offers or sells a security without registration.7 5
All of the federal securities law restrictions which apply to the corporation's dealings with others and to its compliance with the federal
securities laws generally also apply indirectly to those persons within the
corporation who assist the corporation in its activities. These persons
may violate the federal securities laws as participants, as controlling
76
persons, or as aiders and abettors.
Although regulation of the initial distribution of securities is the primary
thrust of the 1933 Act, it is important to recognize that disclosures are
also required when a corporation or a controlling person undertakes to
resell securities previously acquired. 77 In such circumstances, the registration requirements apply to all shares sold by a corporation or by its
controlling persons, and the shares must either be registered or an exemption from registration must be found. Significantly, a corporate director may, in certain circumstances, be regarded as a controlling person
for this purpose.

71. Id. § 77k(a).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 771.
74. See, e.g., Jubran v. Musikahn Corp., 673 F. Supp. 108, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
76. See, e.g., id. (liability under section 11 of the 1933 Act attaches to directors); id. § 78t
(controlling persons jointly and severally liable for violations of either section 11 or section 12 of
the 1934 Act); THoMAs L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcunaims REGULATION § 7.2, at 281 (2d ed. 1990)
(finding that aiding and abetting liability generally applies to the securities acts).
77. These disclosures may be required because the controlling person fits within section 2(11)'s
broad definition of underwriting, which includes persons who acquire securities with a view toward
distribution. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1988).
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B.

Continuing Disclosure Requirements
The 1934 Act requires most publicly-owned corporations to file periodic
reports with the SEC and to comply with the federal proxy rules. 7 These
include the filing of annual and quarterly reports (Forms 10-K and 10Q, respectively) and reports upon the occurrence of specified events (Form
8-K); disclosure in connection with proxy statements and annual reports
to shareholders; and the filing of reports in connection with tender offers
and takeover bids. 79 In addition to the formal disclosure requirements,
the corporation has an ongoing duty to disclose to shareholders and
investors, normally through press releases, all material events in a timely
manner. 0 In this connection, the SEC has expressed the view that a
corporation violates the 1934 Act if it makes a positive press release but
falls concurrently to reveal material adverse information (whether or not
related to the disclosures made) about itself."' The corporation may also
be required to make certain disclosures when it purchases, or offers to
purchase, significant amounts of its own securities or the securities of
another corporation. Further, federal securities laws, as well as a number
82
of state corporations laws, may impose various other constraints.
If a false or misleading statement in a periodic report or other document
filed with the SEC affects the market price of a security, Section 18 of
the 1934 Act makes any person who made or caused the statement to
be made liable for damages to anyone who purchases or sells the security
in reliance on the statement, unless the person sued proves that he "acted
in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading." 83 Section 18 applies only to periodic SEC reports and to
proxy statements A4 In part because of the necessity for an investor to
prove reliance upon a document filed with the Commission, instances of
liability under Section 18 are rare.
More frequently, claims based on false and misleading statements in
reports and other communications have been brought under the broader
antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act.85 Rule lOb-5 states that it is unlawful
for any person in connection with the purchase or sale of a security:
to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the

78. Id. §§ 78q, 78n.
79. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 (annual reports); 240.13a-13 (quarterly reports); 240.13a-11 (special
events); 240.14a-3 to -12 (proxy solicitations); 240.14d-1 to -103 (tender offers and takeover bids).
80. Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 33-5092,
Release No. 34-8995, Release No. IC-6209, 1970 WL 5619, at *1 (SEC) (Oct. 28, 1970) [hereinafter
Timely Disclosure].
81. Id.
82. For example, section 13(d) of the 1934 Act requires any person who acquires more than
five percent beneficial ownership interest in any class of equity securities subject to the Act's reporting
requirements to file a statement of ownership with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
83. Id.§ 78r(a).
84. See id.
85. The primary antifraud provision contained in the 1934 Act is Rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (1992).
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light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-

ing .... 86
The antifraud provisions are not limited in their application to documents
filed with the Commission. For example, 8the
provisions cover statements
7
in shareholder reports and press releases.
Although proxy statements are subject to the provisions of the 193488
Act that apply to false and misleading statements in filed documents
and to the antifraud provisions that may apply to any communication, 9
proxy statements are governed by separate provisions of the 1934 Act
which have been interpreted to impose a higher standard of care than
is applicable in some other contexts. 90
Rule 14a-9 under the 1934 Act provides that no solicitation shall be
made by means of any proxy statement or other communication which
shall contain a statement that,
at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is
made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements therein not false or misleading .... 91
Guidance as to what constitutes a material fact in a proxy statement has
been given by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc.92 The general standard of materiality as set forth in that case is that
"[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote." 93
As a result of these provisions, it is extremely important for directors
to ascertain that all reasonable efforts are made to assure that corporate
publicity and reports are accurate and complete. Further, it is important
that public disclosure of material developments be made on a timely
basis when the information is reliable and appropriately verified, subject
in certain limited cases to legitimate deferral in furtherance of a valid
corporate purpose. To this end, directors should examine the procedures
established for corporate publicity and reports, including the role of legal
counsel and, in the case of financial information, the corporation's
auditors, and should also consider the role and involvement of the directors
and senior management in the process. Circumstances vary widely, and
there can be no broadly prescribed procedures. While they should not
be held responsible for personally verifying the accuracy of underlying
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
87. Timely Disclosure, supra note 80.
88. Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act imposes liability on any person responsible for false or
misleading statements in connection with documents required to be filed with the SEC. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(a) (1988).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1992).
92. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
93. Id.at 449.
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facts contained in corporate publicity and reports, the directors should
be satisfied that the procedures in place are reasonably designed to assure
that accuracy and completeness will be achieved.
C. The Williams Act
The so-called Williams Act 94 provisions of the 1934 Act require persons
making tender cffers or owning beneficially more than 5% of the out(on
standing stock of a corporation to file certain disclosure documents
95
Form 13D) and to comply with other substantive requirements.
The determination of the beneficial ownership of securities in cases of
complex corporate structures may sometimes be difficult. Section 13(d)(1)
imposes disclosure requirements on a person who "directly or indirectly"
acquires the "beneficial ownership" of more than 5% of a class of
publicly traded equity securities. 96 Securities Exchange Act Rule 13d-3
states:
a beneficial owner of a security includes any person who, directly or
indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares:
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the
voting of, such security; and/or,
(2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to
direct the disposition of, such security.Y
Failure to file under Section 13(d) and (e) exposes the company and its
directors to the possibility of an enforcement action by the SEC and to
legal actions by-the company's shareholders. 98
D. Insider Trading
The federal securities law also prohibits corporate insiders from purchasing or selling securities, either in the open market or in private
transactions, without revealing all material information known to them
about their corporation.9 The federal courts have stated clearly that
insiders, including directors, who do not make adequate disclosures must
refrain from entering into securities transactions. 1°
Not only do the federal securities laws prohibit insiders from taking
advantage of material nonpublic corporate information, but they prohibit
them from giving tips-either by revealing nonpublic information to others

94. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78h(d)-(O).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 20.13d-I (1992).
96. Id.
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1992).
98. The SEC has been given wide investigatory and enforcement powers in the courts. See
generally Thomas L. Hazen, Administrative'Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and
Exchange Commissions' Use of Enforcement Techniques, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 427 (1979).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 73t (1988).
100. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, reh'g denied, 407 U.S. 916 (1972)
(finding that rule 10b-5 bars insiders from engaging in purchases or sales of securities while in
possession of material nonpublic information without making adequate disclosure).
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for the purpose of assisting their trading activities or by making recommendations to buy or sell based upon such information. 0 1 The federal
securities laws also prohibit the receiver
of tips, the "tippee," from acting
0 2
on corporate inside information. 1
The prohibitions against trading based upon inside information raise
concerns regarding directors' possible possession of material inside information. The corporation's management can be helpful in providing
directors with guidance as to whether at any given time there is any
material information concerning the corporation which is not public.
Many corporations have developed procedures for directors to contact
regular corporate counsel before trading, permitting each proposed transaction to be reviewed by counsel in the light of the current state of
public information.
Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act requires beneficial owners of more
than 10% of a class of publicly traded equity securities, as well as officers
and directors of corporations that issue such securities, to file reports
with the SEC disclosing the amount of all classes of the issuer's securities
that are so beneficially owned. 03 Initial reports of beneficial ownership
must be made on Form 3 within ten days after any person becomes the
beneficial owner of 10% or more of any class of equity security or
becomes an officer or director. 1 4 Statements of changes in ownership
must be filed on Form 4 within ten days after the end of each month
0 5
in which any change in beneficial ownership has occurred.
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act allows the issuer, or any security
holder suing on its behalf, to recover certain securities trading profits
made by a stockholder owning more than 10% of any class of its equity
securities, or by any of its officers or directors.'0 The profits recoverable
from the above-described persons are those arising from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of the company
within a period of less than six months.10 7 To be liable, a beneficial
owner must own at least 10% of the stock at the time of both the
purchase and the sale of the security involved.0 8
Liability may unexpectedly result from the application of section 16(b),
since the profit realized is determined by considering all of the individual's
transactions within a six month period and matching them by taking the
highest sale price and the lowest purchase price until all purchases and
sales have been accounted for.' °9 Under this system, the highest sales
price during a six month period is matched with the lowest purchase
price during that period and each purchase and sale or sale and purchase

101.
102.
103.
104.

15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
Id. § 78t(b).
Id. § 78p(a).
Id.

105. See id.
106. Id. § 78p(a).
107. Id. § 78p(b).

108. Id. § 78p(a).
109. See Arrow Distrib. Corp. v. Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1986).
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is then compared in order to compute "profit" in a manner so as to
produce the greatest possible profit.12 0 As a result, it is possible for a
beneficial owner or director to be liable to make payment to his corporation under section 16(b) even though he has not in fact made a
profit.
1. Definition of Purchase or Sale
Section 16(b) has been broadly interpreted so that the terms "purchase"
and "sale" may in certain circumstances include gifts, reclassifications,
intercorporate transactions and pledges."' Thus, a merger of the corporation with another corporation could be a sale or purchase transaction
and could be matched with purchases and sales made six months before
or after the merger.
2. Timing of Purchase
An individual may be subject to liability as a director for purchases
or sales which occurred before becoming a director or after his status
as a director terminates.1 2 Thus, if a director purchases (sells) shares of
his corporation, resigns, and sells (purchases) those shares within six
months after the purchase (sale), liability will be imposed for short swing
profits.
Although Section 16(a) and Section 16(b) are based on beneficial
ownership of securities, as is Section 13(d), the concepts of beneficial
ownership under Section 13(d)(1) and Section 16 may be different. In
an interpretive release, the SEC has stated:
The Commission has never specifically defined the term "beneficial
ownership" for purposes of Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act ....
Rule 13d-3 [17 CFR 240.13d-3] under the Exchange Act sets out a
very detailed definition of beneficial ownership for purposes of the
reporting requirements under Section 13(d) and the Commission's
tender offer rules. While the concepts of beneficial ownership under
Section 16(a) and under Rule 13d-3 have much in common, the former
stresses the economic benefit to be derived from the securities and
the latter emphasizes the ability to control or influence the voting or
disposition of the securities. As a result, different determinations of
beneficial ownership under the section and rule are possible."'

110. Id.
111. For example, although a gift generally is not subject to section 16(b), if a donee is the alter
ego of the corporate insider and sells a security soon after receiving it as a gift, then the sale of
such security may be attributed to the insider and thus trigger section 16(b) liability. See Truncale
v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
112. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1036 (1970) (finding section 16(b) liability attached to director who resigned prior to a sale at a
profit within six months of his purchase); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959) (attaching
section 16(b) liability to officer who became officer after his purchase but prior to sale within six
months of purchase).
113. Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading, Exchange Act
Release No. 18114, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,147 (SEC) (Oct. 1, 1981) (emphasis added).
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Whether an individual or corporate entity has the ability to "control
or influence the voting or disposition of the securities" of a publiclyheld U.S. company is a factual question which can only be answered
after full discussion of all the pertinent facts with legal counsel.
III.

GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
The responsibilities of the individual corporate director have been
outlined above. This section translates those responsibilities into more
specific actions which directors might take in order to meet their legal
responsibilities.
A.

Corporate Management
As discussed above, the fundamental responsibility of the individual
corporate director is to represent the interests of the shareholders as a
group, as the owners of the enterprise, in directing the business and
affairs of the corporation within the law. To this end directors should:
- review and confirm basic corporate objectives
- select competent senior executives and monitor personnel policies
and procedures with a view to assuring that the enterprise is
provided with other competent managers in the future
- review the performance of the senior managers thus selected and
monitor the performance of the enterprise.
Under the Model Business Corporation Act, the individual corporate
director, together with his fellow directors, is also required or authorized
to:
- adopt or change bylaws
- approve amendments to the articles of incorporation (subject to
shareholder approval)"
- cancel reacquired shares
- allocate to capital surplus consideration received for shares without
par value
- change the registered office or registered agent
- approve any plan of merger or consolidation (subject to shareholder
approval)
- recommend dissolution
- declare dividends
- elect corporate officers
4
- call special meetings of the shareholders'
In addition, each corporate director should be concerned that appropriate
board attention is given to material transactions affecting the assets of
the enterprise, such as those involving the issuance or reacquisition of

114. See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, §§ 2.06 (adopt bylaws); 10.03 (approve amendments); 6.31
(acquire shares); 6.40(2a-c) (shareholder distribution rules); 5.02 (change of office or agent); 11.01
(approve merger plan); 14.02 (recommend dissolution); 6.40(la) (declare dividends); 8.40 (elect

officers); 7.02 (call special meetings).
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its securities or indebtedness, capital investment, business acquisitions or
dispositions or other new business activities.
The corporate director should be concerned that the enterprise's principal disclosure documents, such as prospectuses, proxy statements and
annual reports to shareholders, are complete and accurate. While the
individual should read such documents carefully for possible errors or
omissions of which he may have personal knowledge, his primary responsibility is to be satisfied that procedures being followed are likely
to result in completeness and accuracy in the preparation of these disclosure documents, including the opportunity for their review by the
corporation's auditors and legal counsel. Questions that the individual
director may have regarding the adequacy of disclosure should be pursued
by him until satisfactorily resolved, and he should familiarize (and satisfy)
himself concerning the procedures established for authorization, review
and clearance cf both disclosure documents and important press releases.
In exercising his duties, it is important that the corporate director
avoid taking an adversarial attitude in his relationship with management.
However, in those special cases where actual or potential conflicts of
interest involving management or those advising management are presented, it has been appropriately suggested that "[a] healthy skepticism
and a bias toward seeking outside advice are useful attitudes for the
outside director . ..
1."I5
If a corporate director has reservations concerning a proposed course
of action, he has a duty to express them to both management and his
fellow directors. If he disagrees with any action taken by the board
having significant implications or consequences, he should vote against
the proposal and request that his dissent, and reasons therefor, be recorded
in the minutes of the meeting.1 6 Genuine disagreement regarding a particular proposal normally should not cause him to consider resigning.
B.

Information Flow
The corporate director should be concerned with the establishment and
maintenance of an effective reporting system. The information flow from
management to members of the board should encompass:
-

-

internal financial statements, structured in a way that presents a
meaningful breakdown of the enterprise's activities and summarized
in a way that permits ready comprehension and reasonable analysis
periodic briefing by senior executives concering developments affecting the business and affairs of the enterprise; in some cases,
this dimension of reporting will be effectively accomplished by a
memorandum from the chief executive officer distributed to the
board members in advance of each meeting

115. Noyes E. Leech & Robert H. Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held
Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799, 1823 (1976).
116. See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 8.24(d).
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forward planning, including crucial issues facing the enterprise and
new directions appropriate for board consideration in the context
of corporate policy.

Aside from direct communications from the chief executive officer and
the chief financial officer, the corporate secretary frequently serves as
the regular channel of communication to directors on corporate matters.
The adequacy of the information provided to directors should be reviewed
from time to time.
The corporate director should also obtain, to the extent available,
information materials available from outside sources, such as research
analyses by investment firms and business publication materials, dealing
with not only the enterprise but also with its competitors and trade
association advisory reports.
The corporate director should feel that he is sufficiently informed about
a proposal so that he can explain a vote for or against it. If he believes
that adequate information is not being provided for such purposes and
is unsuccessful in his efforts to remedy the situation, he should consider
resigning.
C. Legal Compliance and Assistance
The corporate director should be concerned that the corporation has
programs looking toward compliance with applicable laws and regulations,
both foreign and domestic; that it circulates (as appropriate) policy
statements to this effect to its employees; and that it maintains procedures
for monitoring such compliance. In order to facilitate the corporation's
compliance with the law, it is desirable that regular corporate counsel
have appropriate access to the board of directors; that the corporation
be supplied with legal services adequate to assure that its policies will
be implemented; and that all lawyers rendering legal services for the
corporation have a direct channel of communication to regular corporate
counsel so as to assure that failures of compliance will be promptly
brought to his attention and, in appropriate cases, by regular corporate
counsel to the chief executive officer, in order to permit corrective steps
to be taken. Not only will adequate legal services contribute to the
implementation of a corporation's legal compliance policies, but it is
more likely that a corporation's public disclosure obligations in regard
to legal problems will be appropriately discharged.
Directors should ask to be advised concerning any special legal compliance problems, such as court orders imposing continuing restrictions
on operations or higher standards of conduct in particular areas. Examples
would include an antitrust consent decree restricting the corporation's
marketing practices for certain products or prohibiting acquisitions in
certain markets, or a consent decree directed toward future compliance
with disclosure responsibilities under the federal securities laws. The
director's inquiry should be as to the existence of mechanisms that will
cause the corporation to observe such special legal requirements.
There may be occasions when there is need for the corporate director
to have outside advice. The director should be assured that, in appropriate
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circumstances, he (alone or together with fellow directors) has a direct
channel of communication with the enterprise's principal advisors, including its auditors, its regular corporate counsel and, when such a
relationship exists, its investment banking advisors and its executive compensation counselors. Further, there may be occasions when an outside
advisor should be specially retained to assist the board or a committee
in connection with a particular matter. The need for outside advice should
be infrequent, arising most often in the unusual or corporate crisis
situation.
D. Disclosure and Confidentiality
The discussion of federal securities laws above deals principally with
SEC requirements for filing disclosure documents. Additionally, if a
material event occurs, it should be reported promptly to investors generally, although courts have recognized that a variety of proper business
purposes will justify a delay in disclosure.11 7 Typically, such public disclosure is accomplished through a press release. Occasionally the releases
are mailed directly to shareholders, in addition to distribution through
other financial information channels. Certain developments are appropriate for public disclosure, but may not be so critical as to make an
immediate press release appropriate. These items can be communicated
as part of the quarterly earnings reports.
Press releases must avoid misstatements or material omissions. A high
degree of accuracy, completeness and balance between positive and negative factors is required. There is no room for the degree of puffing in
financial disclosures which would be acceptable in general commercial
advertising or other areas of commercial communication.
In this connection directors should make sure that the corporation
adopts internal procedures regarding disclosures to the financial community. The corporation should be certain that material information is
disclosed on a timely basis when appropriate, and also that there are no
leaks or inadvertent disclosures when release of information is inappropriate. There should be clear lines of authority and responsibility within
the corporation, with a limited number of persons authorized to deal
with the financial community. All employees should be alerted to these
basic principles, including particularly the obligations to maintain the
confidentiality of undisclosed material information and to refrain from
trading while privy to such information.
As a corollary of the foregoing, it is essential that the confidentiality
of material information be strictly maintained by all persons who may
have access to that information, regardless of title or position. A public
company normally has some degree of discretion in determining when

117. Preliminary acquisition negotiations, for example, need not be disclosed until an agreement
has been reached as to the transaction's structure and price. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d
1169, 1177 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987) (finding preliminary acquisition negotiations

nonmaterial).
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an event is ripe for public disclosure, assuming no leaks. A reasonable
standard, consistently applied for affirmative as well as negative information, usually will avoid difficulties. However, there are certain circumstances where a company's hand may be forced and good practices
will require a disclosure-for example, where there has been a leak of
information or where rumors are circulating in the financial community.
Care should be taken to prevent these circumstances.
E.

Director's Role in Selected Circumstances

1. Financial Audits
The proper conduct of the financial audit bears directly upon directors'
personal exposure to liability as well as upon the financial welfare of
the corporation and its shareholders. Audited financial statements lie at
the heart of the annual report to shareholders required of all publiclyheld business corporations, as well as of annual reports and registration
statements filed with the SEC. 18 As discussed above, a person will be
exposed to legal liability under the federal securities laws if he or she
shall "make or cause to be made" any statement that is "false or
misleading with respect to a material fact" in a report filed under the
1934 Act.11 9 As for audited financial statements in 1933 Act registration
statements, directors probably would be among those called upon to
defend themselves in the event of a claim that the financial statements
were false or misleading. The directors would then bear the burden of
proving that they "had no reasonable ground to believe and did not
1
believe" that the financial statements were false or misleading. b
The independence of the auditor is central to the function of the
financial audit. The auditor's independence in fact, in the sense of freedom
from management influence, is in turn a matter about which the board
of directors needs to be assured. To perform this task, the board of
2
directors often forms an audit committee.1 '
A principal function of the independent audit committee is to protect
the auditors from undue management influence by serving as a communications link between the independent auditors (as well as the corporation's internal audit staff) and the board of directors. 122 In the SEC's
view the review of an audit by the audit committee should cover the
following in addition to the auditor's report or opinion:
- the auditor's perception of the corporation's financial and accounting personnel;

118. See, e.g., 1934 Act, supra note 37, § 78n(c); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-3(1) (1981); 1933 Act,
supra note 30, Schedule A, Items 25, 26.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988).
120. Id. § 77k(b)(3).
121. See MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 8.25(a) (authorizing board of directors to create committees
and appoint members).
122. See generally id. § 8.25, cmt. at 8-146 (finding audit committees perform vital review and
control functions).
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the cooperation they received during the audit;
the extent to which the corporation's resources were and should
be used to minimize the time spent;
any significant transactions not a normal part of the corporation's
business;
any changes in accounting principles and practices;
any significant proposed adjustments; and
any recommendations the auditors may have for improving internal
accounting controls, choice of accounting principles, or management
systems. 3

In practice the audit committee's review should include review, before
publication, of the financial statements themselves.
2. Acquisitions and Mergers
Three fundamental questions arise in merger transactions: (1) should
management have the exclusive role in framing the merger; (2) to what
extent can the director rely upon the management's presentation of the
facts of the merger proposal; and (3) can a director conscientiously vote
for the transaction if he or she thinks the proposal is merely within
reason, as opposed to one that coincides precisely with the director's
personal view of the transaction. Professors Leech and Mundheim, who
pose these questions in assessing the outside directors' role in mergers,
suggest that the answer to each depends upon the degree to which the
directors have reason to believe that management's interests may diverge
from those of the shareholders. 24
Directors seeking to satisfy themselves as to the desirability of a merger
will want to direct their attention to the following matters:
-

-

-

Does the merger make substantive, long-term good sense for the
company?
Are there special factors (such as those referred to in the preceding
paragraph) that may cause management's judgment to be skewed
in the particular case?
How successful have been management's prior experiences in evaluating and acquiring companies and in securing the expected benefits of such acquisitions?
Is there a determination, based on articulated standards, of the
cash worth of the company being acquired (including a justification
for any premium over market value)? 25

The director's fiduciary duties to the corporation include the duty to
act honestly and fairly when acquisition proposals are made to the

123. Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the
Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 3414970, 1978 WL 19391, at *19 n.21 (SEC) (July 18, 1978).
124. Leech & Mundheim, supra note 115, at 1816-18.
125. Harold M. Williams, Then-SEC Chairman's Address on the Role of the Bidder's Directors
in Takeovers (Mar. 12, 1980) (reported in the Review of Securities Regulation Vol. 13, No. 5).
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corporation or its shareholders.126 Directors presented with acquisition
proposals have the duty to exercise independent judgment in evaluating
the proposal and in making a recommendation to shareholders. The
question of performing or breaching these fiduciary duties is presented,
along with other legal issues, whenever the board of directors authorizes
the use of corporate funds to conduct a proxy contest or to defend
against a tender offer. The issue involved is easily stated: whether the
expenditures were made and other actions were taken in the interest of
furthering some legitimate corporate purpose, or were intended solely or
primarily to enable management to perpetuate itself in office. 27
3. Management Compensation
The legal issue involved in management compensation is basically the
fairness of the compensation. Generally, the directors have the exclusive
right to determine the value of services rendered by the executive officers,
and the directors' decision as to the amount is final if made as result
of a good faith exercise of honest business judgment. Under familiar
principles, a decision based upon the directors' self-interest or involving
some breach of trust would not be protected. The protection of the
business judgment rule may also be dissolved when the amount of compensation (in the form of salaries or bonuses or both) is so large as to
amount to a waste of corporate assets.' 28 Novel arrangements such as
severance payments linked to changes in control of the employer corporation in some cases involve very large amounts; legal challenges which
are just beginning to move through the courts may result in developments
in the law governing management compensation.
Guidelines to assure that directors' decisions relating to management
compensation are soundly based, and demonstrably so, are as follows:
- create compensation plans that work on the basis of relevant
business factors and are consistent with the long-term interests of
the corporation - e.g., compensation practices that do not encourage
maximization of short-term profit at the expense of longer-term
growth;
- review any variable compensation plan continually to see that it
operates fairly and objectively;
- periodically scrutinize any bonus plan as to philosophy and application - e.g., make an effort to confine it to management
personnel whose effect on the corporation is measurable and upon
whose performance the incentive is measurable;

126. These duties are derived from the director's general duty of care found in MODEL ACT,
supra note 2, § 8.30.
127. See EDWARD R. ARANow ET AL., DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
269-70 (1977). See dlso Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An Update After
One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017, 1019-22 (1981).
128. See Pogistin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 626 (Del. 1984) (stating that challenges to compensation
plans must allege that compensation was "so devoid of a legitimate corporate purpose as to be a
waste of assets").
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take steps to reform any compensation plan that begins to yield
amounts not reasonably related to executive performance;
have financial calculations under incentive compensation plans reviewed by independent accountants;
obtain advice from independent counsel when questions arise concerning compensation arrangements as to which inside counsel has
a personal interest. 29
CONCLUSION

This article is a general summary and outline of some very complex
legal principles and requirements. It necessarily omits details, refinements
and exceptions which would be pertinent in the legal analysis of a
particular issue and therefore should not be used in the place of legal
advice in taking specific actions.

129. See generally Leech & Mundheim, supra note 115, at 1823.

